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Resonance Attacks on Load Frequency
Control of Smart Grids
Yongdong Wu, Zhuo Wei, Jian Weng, Xin Li, and Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Load frequency control (LFC) is widely employed
to regulate power plants in modern power generation systems
of smart grids. This paper presents a simple and yet powerful
type of attacks, referred to as resonance attacks, on LFC power
generation systems. Specifically, in a resonance attack, an adver-
sary craftily modifies the input of a power plant according to a
resonance source (e.g., rate of change of frequency) to produce a
feedback on LFC power generation system, such that the state of
the power plant quickly becomes instable. Extensive computer
simulations on popular LFC power generation system models
which consist of linear, non-linear, and/or high-order items clearly
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. As the
attack has very low computational cost and communication over-
head, it is easy to launch in resource-limited devices such as
intelligent electronic devices. In our simulations, the attacker
keeps modified input within the normal operating range so as
to invade plausibility and consistency based attack detection
methods and yet the modifications can quickly drive the system
beyond the admissible boundary. Another interesting finding is
that by maliciously modifying the input such as power load
and tie-line signal over multi-area interconnection channels, a
multi-area LFC power generation system could become unreli-
able more quickly than a single-area system. Finally, we propose
countermeasures on the proposed attacks.
Index Terms—Load frequency control (LFC), rate of change of
frequency (RoCoF), cyber-physical system (CPS) security, false
data injection (FDI), system stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART grids are reliable, sustainable and safe thanksto ICC (Information, Communication and Control)
technologies which enable real-time exchange of system
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control information among grid subsystems and consumers.
However, the open communication architecture of ICC also
makes smart grids vulnerable to cyber-attacks with poten-
tially catastrophic consequences. For instance, an experimental
cyber attack on a replica of a power plant’s control system
caused a generator to self-destruct [1].
In order to ensure electricity equipments to work properly,
frequency of the electric power must be stable [2]. However,
as the amount of actual load changes from time to time in
practice,1 it is hard to stabilize power frequency [3]. In spite of
load dynamics, both electricity frequency f (t) and its RoCoF
(Rate of Change of Frequency) f˙ (t) = dfdt should remain within
their admissible intervals all the time according to the grid
code for safe, secure, economic and proper functioning of the
electricity system [5].
A good solution to power frequency stabilization takes
the interests of both power providers and customers into
consideration. To this end, load management technologies
have been deployed to achieve load peak clipping, valley
filling, peak shifting [6]–[9]. Although load management
schemes are able to reduce equipment damage or prolonged
imbalance that could lead to cascading failures and massive
blackouts, the customers in disconnected regions may suf-
fer significant loss of comfort or money, and even personal
safety [10].
Different from load management which simply sheds or
curtails power load, LFC (Load Frequency Control) shares
the power regulation burden or capacity via the tie-lines
in interconnected power systems to ensure the balance of
load and frequency. As its heterogenous and dynamic power
systems have to exchange information and power in real-time,
a multi-area LFC is more complex than load management,
such that unreliability and instability of one LFC area could
quickly propagate to all the other interconnected areas.
To ensure reliability and stability of an entire LFC system,
two major technologies have been proposed or even adopted
in smart grids: (1) generator collaboration mechanism which
deals with the measured tie-line frequencies in a multi-area
LFC system with different technologies [11]–[13]; (2) Wide-
area monitoring system which is supported by a network of
devices deployed over a vast geographical area [14]–[17].
1For instance, based on real loading data published by Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) which schedules power on an electric grid that
connects more than 43,000 miles of transmission lines and 550 genera-
tion units, the actual hourly load varies within the interval [35,993MWh,
45,056MWh] on 11 Jan. 2016 [4].
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The above stabilization technologies work well when
they are deployed in protected and/or benign environments.
However, they may perform poorly or even fail to func-
tion in malicious situations when smart grids suffer from a
variety of cyber attacks, such as TDS (Time-Delay Switch)
attack [18], DOS (Denial-of-Service) attack [19], FDI (False
Data Injection) at breaker [20], FDI at controller [21] and
FDI at sensor [22]. In particular, false load attack attempts to
cause circuit overflow at the most vulnerable areas of the elec-
tric grid, and hence is very effective and convenient [23]–[25]
even if the adversary is restricted to simply tamper with the
signals in a specified range of their allowed values. To pro-
tect LFC systems against this kind of attacks, the approaches
in [26]–[28] integrate monitoring mechanisms and data anal-
ysis technologies to check the plausibility and consistency
of data flows. In these countermeasures, a load disturbance
model is used to check the soundness of load measurement
such as [29]. Once the measurement deviates from the model
beyond a predefined boundary, the controller of the LFC
system raises a load-tampering alarm.
Based on the resonance principle, this paper introduces a
new type of attacks which is able to defeat the plausibility
and consistency based attack detection techniques mentioned
above. Specifically, in a resonance attack, an attacker alters
power load according to a resonance source RoCoF such
that the modified load is kept within an admissible interval.
Although the load changes are too small to be identified by
detection methods, they could lead to abnormal frequency
and/or RoCoF in the power system. Alternatively, the inter-
nal states of a power plant, power frequency and their delayed
values can be used as resonance sources too. For a multi-area
interconnected LFC system, the resonance attack can also be
launched by altering tie-line signal besides load. To demon-
strate effectiveness of the resonance attacks, we conduct digital
simulations on single-area and multi-area LFC system models
which consist of linear/non-linear items, one-order/high-order
items, AVR (Automatic Voltage Regulator) and PSS (Power
System Stabilizer). The simulation results show that the dam-
age of attacks on LFC in one area can propagate to other
interconnected areas. Finally, we address countermeasures to
the attacks by invalidating the resonance.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the novel resonance attack and applies it
on the simple linear model of LFC power systems, including
single-area LFC and multiple-area LFC. Section III addresses
the alternative resonance attacks and Section IV examines the
attacks on complex models of LFC power systems. Section VI
discusses the attack feasibility, countermeasures and compar-
ison with the existing attacks. Section VI draws conclusions
and remarks on future research topics.
II. RESONANCE ATTACK ON LFC
In any modern power system, a large frequency devia-
tion can damage equipments, degrade load performance, cause
overload of transmission lines, and ultimately lead to an unsta-
ble condition for the power system. For example, violation of
frequency control requirements was known as a main reason
for Italy power grid blackouts.2 Thus frequency (f ) and RoCoF
(f˙ ) are two important electricity power parameters, and must
remain stable all the time. As the divergency of RoCoF often
results in the divergency of frequency, and there are many
works on the stability of frequency, the following sections will
focus on RoCoF only unless otherwise stated.
Typical RoCoF protection relay in a power system has a
boundary [B0, B1] = [0.1, 1.0] Hz/s, depending on the inertia
of the power system [30], e.g., the required RoCoF boundary
is 0.5 Hz/s in Ireland [31]. As a consequence, if an adversary
is able to attack a power system such that its RoCoF is beyond
the predefined boundary, the RoCoF relays may trip to protect
the electricity equipments. If there are many relay trips, the
power system may go blackout. This section will propose a
novel resonance attack on LFC system to cause RoCoF relay
trips by craftily manipulating the load of the power system.
A. LFC Model
As a major function of AGC (Automatic Generation
Control), LFC is able to balance load and frequency, and is one
of the important control mechanisms in power system design
and operation. Generally, a power system may consist of sev-
eral LFC areas. We provide a brief description of the LFC
model below. For more details, please refer to [32].
Fig. 1 shows the dynamic model of the ith LFC area in a
multi-area LFC system. The model consists of a plant G(s)
and an outer controller, where the plant G(s) further consists
of three modules and an inner speed regulator. The three mod-
ules are governor, turbine and generator respectively. Denote
Pˆvi , Pˆti , and fˆi as the deviation of the governor output, the
deviation of the turbine output, and the deviation of system
output frequency, respectively. The regulator is used to adapt
to local load deviations. When the system frequency devi-
ates from the nominal frequency f0, either over frequency or
under frequency, the frequency deviation is fed back as an
ACE (Area Control Error) signal which is used to generate the
outer control signal based on a control algorithm. Currently, PI
(Proportional Integral) controller is commonly used as an outer
controller in LFC system [33]. It aims to drive frequency fi to
nominal frequency f0 in tens of seconds whenever a step-load
perturbation Lˆi is applied to the power system [2].
In a multi-area power system, the generation units are con-
nected over inter-area transmission lines so as to automatically
balance the dynamic load among power areas. To this end,
the frequency signals from all the connected LFC areas are
exchanged via tie-lines among LFC areas and used in the outer
controller. Denote Pˆtiei as the deviation of tie-line signal in the
ith area. With reference to Fig. 1, it is easy to show that
Pˆtiei(s) =
⎛
⎝Tiifˆi(s) −
J∑
j=1,j =i
Tijfˆj(s)
⎞
⎠ × 2π
s
(1)
where fˆi = fi−f0, Tij = Tji is the connectivity strength between
area i and area j, and Tii = ∑Jj=1,j =i Tji, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , J for
a power system having J LFC areas. In the ideal situation,
the LFC power system is perfectly managed, i.e., deviation of
2http://www.rae.gr/old/cases/C13/italy/UCTE_rept.pdf
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Fig. 1. The ith control area in a multi-area LFC system including non-reheat
steam unit, where G(s) (within the dotted-dash box) is the close-loop transfer
function of the plant and dotted lines represent the inter-area connection, Pˆvi
and Pˆti are the change of valve position for controlling mechanical force and
the change of the generator mechanical output respectively, and P is the
output from AVR (see Section IV-B). Adapted from [32].
tie-line signal Pˆtiei = 0 and frequency deviation fˆi = 0. In
practice, the controllers aim to minimize fˆi and Pˆtiei for all the
LFC areas in case of load fluctuation.
B. Security Model
Fig. 2 is a simplified power system architecture marked with
several possible attack points. Because electric power can not
be stored on a large scale, a power generation system attempts
to produce electricity according to customers’ load demand Li
in real-time. Therefore, after receiving the customers’ power
load request via a network, the control center instructs the
power plant to generate the demanded power by adjusting
the amount of external energy such as the rate of burning oil
in the power generator (e.g., Siemens Air-Cooled Generators
SGen-100A-4P Series). However, in a malicious situation, the
customers’ equipment, the control center and their communi-
cation channels are vulnerable to data modification or injection
attacks. In addition, for a power system consisting of gen-
erators distributed over several areas, input signals such as
frequency signal fj transmitted among the power generation
areas may be tampered with by the attacker too.
By maliciously manipulating the input signals3 such as
aggregated load Li or individual customer load Lik, an attacker
aims to drive the power grid to undesirable or dangerous states.
To this end, the attacker is assumed to be able to
(1) Observe the parameters of power system output (e.g.,
electricity frequency);
(2) Stealthily modify the input without being detected.
The first assumption means the attacker knows the system
output all the time. In practice, it is not hard to measure system
output because electricity produced by any power generator is
usually delivered to customers over open areas. For example,
the electricity voltage and frequency can be easily measured
by anyone. The second assumption assumes that the attacker is
3For ease of exposition, we assume that the attacker manipulates the digital
signal of the load. In Section V-B, we will elaborate how the attacker can
tamper with the actual load for the same purpose.
Fig. 2. A simplified power system architecture, where DAS (Demand
Aggregation System) in a control center is used to aggregate customers’ input.
Thick blue line indicates power flow, solid black line indicates information
flow, and dash line indicates that the attacker tampers with the load signals.
able to modify or inject input data within a range. For example,
using the power load altering methods in [34], the faked input
|x(t)| < xmax for any time t, where xmax is some predefined
constant. As the modification is too small to be detected, the
attack is stealth. Considering the load dynamic range [4] and
mandatory redundancy, we choose xmax = 0.3 pu (per unit)
which will be enforced by the plant.
C. Attack Method
In a nutshell, to launch a resonance attack on a target power
grid, an attacker slightly modifies or fakes input so that the
input resonates with a resonance source, usually the system
output or a function of the system output. Specifically, the
attack process proceeds as follows.
(1) The attacker samples the output of the target power grid
such as power frequency, then modifies/fakes an input
based on a chosen resonance source;
(2) The attacker sends the bogus input to the power gener-
ator system;
(3) The generator system checks on the plausibility of
the input. If the input is within the plausibility range,
the input will be accepted by the power system for
regulating the target power generator;
(4) The generator produces electricity power which is trans-
mitted over the power grid;
(5) As the protection relay periodically measures the elec-
tricity power, it will trip automatically as long as the
measured RoCoF is beyond the admissible boundary.
Simultaneously, the attacker also samples the electricity
power, and decides whether the attack is successful or
not. If not, he repeats the above process.
In the attack process, RoCoF protection relay is not directly
controlled by the attacker. The next subsections will elaborate
how the attacker indirectly controls the RoCoF protection relay
in single-area LFC and multi-area LFC.
D. Attack on Single-Area LFC
Suppose the adversary samples the electricity frequency at
a rate 1,000 Hz,4 and selects xi = Lˆi as the attacking input
which is no more than xmax = 0.3 pu. Furthermore assume the
system delay is τ1 = 0.25s according to the system stability
interval [0, 0.348] specified in [33]. The attacker uses RoCoF
4GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation Event) enables IEC 61850
based devices to quickly exchange critical data (e.g., a trip signal to a circuit
breaker) less than 4 milliseconds, over the Ethernet based communication [35].
Due to Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem, we choose 1,000Hz sampling
frequency.
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TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS IN THE iTH LFC AREA [33]
yi = ˙ˆfi = dfˆidt to measure whether the attack is successful or
not. That is, if RoCoF is beyond the boundary, the attacked
LFC power system will be disconnected from the power grid.
Furthermore, we adopt the LFC system parameters shown in
Table I.
This subsection investigates the stability of the single-area
LFC of area 1, where Pˆtie1 = 0. According to the attack
method presented in Section II-C, an attacker attempts to fake
the load input x1(t) such that RoCoF becomes unstable. To
demonstrate the attack effect, with regard to Fig. 1, the power
generation system with the parameters in Table I is modeled as
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ACE1 = 21Fˆ1
U1 =
(
−1.0 + −1.0
s
)
e−τ1sACE1
Pˆv1 =
(
U1 − Fˆ10.05
)
1
1+0.1s
Pˆt1 = 11+0.3s Pˆv1
Fˆ1 =
(
Pˆt1 e−λ1s − X1
)
1
1+10s
Y1 = sFˆ1
(2)
assume AVR output P = 0, where λ1 is the delay of
governor-turbine module such as DEGOV/DEGOV1 [37], the
upper-case variable is the Laplace transform of the lower-case
(time-domain) variable, e.g., Y1(s) is the Laplace transform of
y1(t). For simplicity, we omit the variable s in the Laplace for-
mulas, i.e., Y1(s) is written as Y1. Assume λ1 = 0, the transfer
function of the single-area LFC can be written as
Y1
X1
= −s
2(1 + 0.1s)(1 + 0.3s)
s(1 + 0.1s)(1 + 0.3s)(1 + 10s) + 21(s + 1)e−τ1s
= − 0.03s
4 + 0.4s3 + s2
0.3s4 + 4.03s3 + 10.4s2 + 21(s + 1)e−τ1s (3)
Clearly, as shown in Fig. 3.a, the step response of system
Eq. (3) is stable if there is no attack. However, when the system
is attacked with input x1(t) = −0.3 × sign(y1(t − 0.25))pu,
where function sign(a) =
{
1 a > 0
−1 a ≤ 0 , its RoCoF goes
beyond the boundary quickly. As a result, the attacked LFC
power plant will be disconnected from the whole power
system, which can cause shortage of power supply and over-
load of other LFC areas. More seriously, power blackout may
happen as more and more LFC power plants are disconnected
from the grid.
Fig. 3. Response of a single-area LFC. (a) No attack, (b) Resonance attack
on a single-area LFC. The RoCoF (thick line) goes beyond 0.6 Hz/s and
the frequency derivation (dashed line) does not converge when the plant is
attacked with the faked input x1(t). f = fˆ = f − f0 is the derivation of power
frequency f from the nominal frequency f0.
E. Attack on Multi-Area LFC
In a multi-area LFC, each generator needs to handle local
load deviation as well as tie-line deviations from other areas in
order to regulate its local and global load balances. However,
this interconnection due to tie-line input can be exploited by
attackers. As we show below, an attacker may need to attack
only one LFC area in order to cause the blackout of the whole
power grid. For simplicity, we assume that all the LFC areas
have the same set of parameters given in Table I, and the
correlation matrix is
T = {Tij}, Tij =
{
0.2 pu/Hz i = j∑J
k=1,k =i Tik i = j
As a concrete example, let’s consider a two-area LFC
system, whose step response RoCoF and tie-line signal Pˆtie1
of area 1 are shown in Fig. 4. Obviously, the step response
is convergent and hence the non-attacked LFC plant system
is stable. However, if the attacker changes the load of area 1
to x1(t) = −0.3 × sign(y1(t − 0.25)) and its inter-connected
frequency deviation fˆ2 to 0.3 × sign(y1(t)), the frequency and
RoCoF of area 1 will become divergent as shown in Fig. 5.a
and Fig. 5.b respectively, and the tie-line signal Ptie1 is shown
in Fig. 5.c. Comparing with the result shown in Fig. 3.b, we
know that the tie-line signal can be exploited to cause higher
RoCoF of area 1 in a two-area LFC system. More seriously,
when area 1 is attacked, the non-attacked area 2 becomes
instable too, as shown in Fig. 5.d.
Fig. 6 shows the performance of attack on a four-area LFC
system when both the load input and all the inter-connected
signals fˆj (j = 2, 3, 4) of the first LFC area are tampered with.
By comparing the attack effects shown in Fig. 3.b, Fig. 5.b
and Fig. 6, we conclude that resonance attacks are more pow-
erful as the number of LFC areas increases. Thus, although
inter-connected infrastructure improves system performance in
general, it increases the attack surface and makes the overall
system more vulnerable.
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Fig. 4. Step response in a two-area LFC. The interconnected area is still
stable when there is a tie-line between two LFC areas.
Fig. 5. Resonance attack to a two-area LFC. In an interconnected LFC power
system, if area 1 is attacked directly, area 2 will be attacked indirectly.
Fig. 6. Resonance attack on a four-area LFC. When both the load x1 and all
the inter-connected signals fˆj (j = 2, 3, 4) are tampered with, the amplitude
of RoCoF (thick line) increases significantly.
III. ALTERNATIVE ATTACKS
Section II introduces the idea of resonance attacks on LFC
power generation system. In the attack, an attacker can easily
fake an attack input xi(t) = −0.3 × sign(yi(t − γ )) for some
delay time γ after measuring the resonance source RoCoF.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF VARIOUS RESONANCE SOURCES
In this section, we will extend the resonance attacks to other
resonance sources and the stealth attack which aims to avoid
detection.
A. Alternative Resonance Sources
The resonance attack aims to fake a load input as a feed-
back of the LFC generator so as to drive RoCoF out of the
admissible boundary. Besides RoCoF, an attacker can employ
generator internal states and frequency derivation as resonance
sources to fake input.
1) Internal State as a Resonance Source: Given that the
plant internal state is known to the attack, a more powerful
attacker is able to modify the load according to the (estimated)
internal states. Fig. 7.a and Fig. 7.b show the attack results
given that the loads are faked based on the governor output
Pv1(t) and the turbine output Pt1(t) respectively.
2) Frequency Derivation as a Resonance Source: It is easy
for an attacker to measure the frequency derivation, and use it
as a resonance reference, i.e., the adversary is able to fake an
attack input xi(t) = −0.3 × sign(fˆi(t)). As shown in Fig. 7.c,
this bogus input also degrades the quality of RoCoF quickly.
Table II summarizes the performance of attacks using dif-
ferent resonance sources. The second column indicates that the
RoCoF-based attack takes less time than others, i.e., shortest
period in Fig. 7. In the third column, the attack using internal
state is difficult to start as it needs to know the internal state of
the plant. But it merely performs slightly better than the other
attacks, as indicated in the last column. Therefore, attack using
RoCoF or frequency derivation as resonance source is adopted
in this paper because it has good attack performance and is
easy to launch.
As resonance attack takes effect as long as the bogus input
correlates with the target output, we expect that the input
delay will also have impact on the attack performance. In fact,
Fig. 7.d ∼ 7.f and Fig. 3.b demonstrate that delayed source
can also be used for attacks, and different delay γ ∈ [0, 0.5s]
incurs only a little difference in terms of attack performance.
B. Stealthy Resonance Attack
In the above attack experiments, the load change is not con-
tinuous, and hence may alert plausibility-based detectors. To
invade this kind of detectors, an attacker may modify the load
value smoothly, e.g., by filtering the bogus inputs xi(t) into a
continuous signal x˜i(t) = α×(−0.3×sign(yi(t)))+(1−α)x¯i(t),
the resonance attack effect represented by RoCoF maximum
is shown in Fig. 8, where x¯i is the mean of function xi(t′) for
t < t′, α ∈ [0, 1].
According to Fig. 8, the attacker can choose α = 0.005 to
have the best attack effect (maximal RoCoF). As shown in
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Fig. 7. Resonance attacks on single-area LFC model using different reso-
nance sources. (a) xi(t) = 0.3 × sign( ˙ˆPvi (t)); (b) xi(t) = 0.3 × sign( ˙ˆPti (t));
(c) xi(t) = −0.3 × sign(fˆi(t)); (d) xi(t) = −0.3 × sign(yi(t)); (e) xi(t) =
−0.3 × sign(yi(t − 0.125)); (f) xi(t) = −0.3 × sign(yi(t − 0.5)).
Fig. 8. Stealthy resonance attack effect on a single-area LFC.
Fig. 9, after the faked load in Fig. 3.b is filtered to be smooth
and then sent to the plant, the resonance attack is still viable.
IV. ATTACKS ON PLANT VARIANTS
Presently, there are roughly 7,000 and 3,000 synchronous
generator models in the typical planning cases of Eastern
Interconnection and WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating
Fig. 9. Stealth resonance attack effect on a single-area LFC, α = 0.005. The
load change is filtered such that the attack is stealthy.
Fig. 10. The governor model with non-linear items, where Px = Ui − fˆiRi
with reference to Fig. 1.
Council) respectively [36]. Apparently, it is difficult and not
very useful to present the attacks to all the models here.
Instead, it may be sufficient to investigate the stability of the
governor-turbine models including basic physical constraints
when they are attacked with the method in Section II.
A. Variant of Governor-Turbine
In a practical conventional electricity plant, the governor has
some restriction items including dead band, rate limiter and
power limiter as shown in Fig. 10, where db is the dead band,
Uo is the maximum of valve opening rate, Uc is the maximum
of valve closing rate, Pmax is the maximum of valve position
and Pmin is the minimum of valve position. In addition, it may
be more accurate to describe turbine with high-order models.
1) Dead Band: The dead band of a governor is defined as
the total magnitude db of a sustained speed change, within
which there is no resulting change in valve position [32].
Mathematically, a dead band function is
Py =
⎧⎨
⎩
Px − db Px > db
Px + db Px < −db
0 otherwise
(4)
Usually, a dead band may change the frequency control
performance, and hence may impact the attack performance
too. To simulate the attack performance, we choose a suffi-
ciently large dead band db = 0.1 pu. If there is no attack, the
power plant is stable as shown in Fig. 11.a. However, when
the proposed attack is applied to the plant, the system output
is changed into Fig. 11.b. Clearly, the attack is still effective
even if the governor-turbine has dead band.
2) Rate Limiter: If the electricity power is generated
from the conventional energy source, e.g., thermal energy or
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Fig. 11. Response of a single-area LFC plant where dead band db = 0.1 pu.
(a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack.
Fig. 12. Response of a single-area LFC plant whose governor has a rate
limiter. (a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack.
mechanical energy, the change rate of power generation is
slow. Thus, the governor is not required to change the valve
quickly. In many governor-turbine models such as TGOV5 and
IEEEG1, rate limiter is a mandatory item in order to improve
the accuracy of long-term dynamic studies [36].
As shown in Fig. 12.a, it is stable for a power plant whose
rate limiter is 2RL, where RL = 1.43 is the maximal valve
rate of the step response shown in Fig. 3.a. However, when
the proposed attack is applied to the plant whose governor has
the valve rate limiter, the system output is instable as shown
in Fig. 12.b. In comparison with Fig. 3.b, Fig. 12.b shows
much higher RoCoF and/or frequency deviation, and larger
vibration period. Further experiments show that the output of
the attacked plant is divergent if its rate limiter is within an
interval (0, 15RL).
Fig. 13. Response of a plant whose governor has a power limiter 1.2pu.
(a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack on single-area LFC power system.
According to the experiments on governor with/without
rate limiter, we have two findings: (1) rate limiter dramati-
cally decreases the attack resilience capability of the plant;
(2) if the governor-turbine has a rate limiter, the attack has
impact on long-period (e.g., tens of seconds) LFC, otherwise,
it has impact on short-period (e.g., several seconds) primary
frequency control as shown in Fig. 3.b.
3) Power Limiter: Due to restriction of energy source, a
power generator usually has a limited capacity to produce
power. That is to say, power limiter determines the capac-
ity and scalability of the power generator, and is related to the
valve position controlled by the governor.
Assume governor’s power limiter is 1.2pu (Turbine-GAST
model in [37]), Fig. 13.a shows that the step response of the
power plant with power limiter become zero quickly when
there is no attack. However, when the resonance attack is
applied on the plant, the system output fluctuates as Fig. 13.b.
In comparison with Fig. 3.b, Fig. 13.b has lower RoCoF and
frequency deviation. Thus, power limiter can alleviate the risk
of the present attack. Nonetheless, the RoCoF of the attacked
plant is still beyond the lower boundary B0 = 0.1Hz/s and
hence the attack may incur potential risk on some power grids.
More importantly, the present attack may have significant
impact on a special kind of LFC plants. This kind of plants
includes several governor-turbine units in one area [32] and
each governor has a power limiter. It is stable when there is
no attack as shown in Fig. 14.a, but becomes instable as shown
in Fig. 14.b due to the present attack because the actual power
restriction on each generation unit is reduced.
4) High-Order Turbine Model: In reality, a real turbine is
much more complicated than a one-order model in Fig. 1. In
order to assess the accuracy of the attack, we perform simula-
tions on a high-order turbine model shown in Fig. 15 [36].
According to typical parameters for steam turbine models
in [38], the high-order turbine model has a time constant
tuple {TVH, TH, TI, TL} = {0.3, 8, 8, 0.4} in seconds. If we
perform the attack simulation on the plant with a high-order
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Fig. 14. Response of a plant consisting of five identical generation units.
Each unit has power limiter 1.2pu and participation factor 0.2. (a) No attack;
(b) Resonance attack.
Fig. 15. A high-order turbine model in the standard IEEEG1 model, where
KVH + KH + KI + KL = 1.
Fig. 16. Response of single-area LFC plant with high-order turbine model,
the gain tuple {KVH, KH, KI, KL} = {0.15, 0.50, 0.20, 0.15}. (a) No attack;
(b) Resonance attack.
turbine model, the attack is weakened. However, if there is
a delay factor in the governor-turbine model, the attack will
still be effective, e.g., if the delay λ1 = 0.1s, Fig. 16.a shows
that RoCoF converges quickly when there is no attack, but
Fig. 16.b shows that RoCoF is beyond the boundary when the
plant is attacked.
5) Integrated Governor-Turbine Model: As shown in
Sections IV-A and IV-A4, dead band has minor impact on the
Fig. 17. Response of single-area LFC with integrated governor-turbine model
(single generation unit, and λ1 = 0). (a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack.
Fig. 18. Block diagram of AVR, where VRef = 0.091 is the reference
terminal voltage deviation [39], [40].
attack effect, rate limiter enhances the effect, while power lim-
iter and high-order turbine model weaken the effect. As each
of them exists in a real governor-turbine system, we perform
the present attack on the integrated governor-turbine system
which includes all of them. The non-attack system runs well
as shown in Fig. 17.a, but becomes instable if it is attacked as
shown in Fig. 17.b. In particular, the frequency change of the
integrated governor-turbine model exceeds 1 Hz in 2 minutes
when the faked load fluctuates within [-0.3, 0.3] pu only.
B. Combined Model of LFC and AVR
With reference to [39] and [40], AVR (Automatic Voltage
Regulator) loop is used to regulate the voltage and the reactive
power in the power plant. As shown in Fig. 18, it consists of
PSS (Power System Stabilizer), amplifier, AVR controller, and
exciter, where PSS has a transfer function
φPSS = KPSS × sTw1 + sTw ×
1 + sT1
1 + sT2 (5)
for some constant KPSS. When the proposed attack is applied to
a power plant enhanced with AVR, the attack effect is shown in
Fig. 19. Clearly, AVR does not increase the defense capability
of a power plant.
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TABLE III
AVR PARAMETERS
Fig. 19. Response of a single-area LFC plant which has an AVR item, where
the AVR parameters are listed in Table III. (a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack.
C. PID Output Saturation
PID controller saturation is used to stabilize a plant by
restricting the control signal within an interval. Its disadvan-
tage is that it decreases the system response speed. When the
proposed attack is applied to a power plant whose control sig-
nal is limited to 1.2pu, Fig. 20.b shows that the attack effect
is weakened but still effective. Especially, in an LFC power
system which consists of multiple governor-turbine generation
units, the PID output limiter shall be increased to adapt to wide
load dynamics. Suppose the PID output limiter is increased
according to the number of generation units in one area, but
only a portion of generation units is in operation, the PID sat-
uration may not reduce the attack performance as shown in
Fig. 20.c.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we will discuss random attack, param-
eter sensitivity, and countermeasures to resonance attacks
addressed in Section II. For simplicity, this section focuses on
single-area LFC systems. For multi-area LFC systems, similar
conclusions can be drawn.
Fig. 20. Response of single-area LFC plant with PID output saturation.
(a) No attack; (b) Resonance attack on a generator (single generation unit),
(c) Resonance attack on a plant which has three generation units, but only
one in operation.
Fig. 21. Random manipulation effect on a single-area LFC system when the
load is randomly changed per 50ms.
A. Random Attack
When the input x1 is changed over set {-0.3pu, 0.3pu} ran-
domly, RoCoF fluctuation shown in Fig. 21 is much smaller
than that in Fig. 3.b. Hence the resonance attack clearly
performs much better than random load manipulation.
B. Attack Feasibility
In the present attacks, the adversary has to tamper with
the actual load directly or indirectly. If the load management
process is performed over data networks, the adversary can
tamper with the traffic such that the load management system
increases or decreases the actual load. Otherwise, he will mod-
ify the actual load by compromising the devices such as smart
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Fig. 22. Attack effect on a single-area LFC regarding generator parameters,
where y-axis is the maximal RoCoF over 40s simulation period for each r.
meters. Concretely, according to the characteristics of the tar-
get power system, the attacker can realize the different attack
strategies as follows.
1) Indirect Modification: In some power systems, ELC
(Electronic Load Controller) [42] is used to match load
demand with the generators’ output. Hence, if an adversary
is able to fake the load input of ELC or its customers, he can
achieve actual instantaneous load control as ELC will adjust
(i.e., switch on/off) the actual load based on the faked input.
In other words, if the attacker can indirectly manipulate a por-
tion of actual load via ELC, he is able to start the resonance
attack to threat the entire power grid.
2) Direct Modification: With the advance of smart grids,
electrical devices with grid friendly controller are recom-
mended by U.S. Department of Energy to support power
grid reliability [43], [44] and realize dynamic demand con-
trol [45], [46]. Thus, an adversary is able to achieve actual
instantaneous load control if he can compromise a portion
of gridwise friendly devices with malicious codes and then
directly manipulate the device loads (i.e., switch on/off the
devices).
C. Sensitivity Analysis
In order to study the robustness of the proposed attack using
RoCoF as resonance source, we assume that the system param-
eter is changed at ratio r = VVi ∈ [85%, 115%], where Vi is
the value for parameter V in Table I.
As shown in Fig. 22, different moment of inertia M results
in different resilience effect on the attack, i.e., if the power
system has higher moment of inertia M, it will be more
stable (i.e., lower RoCoF maximum). However, the damp-
ing coefficients D does not have obvious effect on attack
resilience.
Fig. 23 shows the attack resilience of the governor time
constant Tg. Clearly, when the governor time constant is
increased, the attack effect is more significant. Similarly, attack
performance increases with turbine time constant Tt too.
As shown in Fig. 24, when the PI controller coefficient Kp
or KI is changed at any ratio r > 85%, the output of the
attacked system is beyond the admissible boundary, and high
PI coefficients may enhance the attack effect. Therefore, it
should be cautious to choose PI coefficients for stabilizing the
generator in a malicious situation.
Fig. 23. Attack effect on a single-area LFC regarding governor-turbine time
constants.
Fig. 24. Attack effect on a single-area LFC system regarding PI controller
coefficients.
Fig. 25. Attack effect on a single-area LFC system regarding system
parameters.
With reference to Fig. 25, the larger the parameters includ-
ing area feedback gain β, speed drooping parameter R and con-
troller loop delay τ , the higher attack performance. Especially,
the system feedback gain β has the most significant impact on
attack resilience.
D. Countermeasure
Two prerequisites of resonance attacks are that the attacker
is able to access a resonance source such as the system output
and is able to modify or inject input data which resonates with
the resonance source. The output of most power generation
systems such as electric frequency is publicly available, hence
protecting the input data is the only viable countermeasure
to resonance attacks. The problem of protecting data integrity
to prevent both data modification and data injection is well
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studied in the network security community and many effec-
tive solutions have been proposed in the literature. Most of
the solutions employ cryptographic techniques together with
timestamps/sequence numbers to ensure data authenticity and
freshness [47]. In fact, there are security standards such as IEC
62351 for protecting smart grids by specifying cipher suites
(authentication, integrity protection and encryption algorithms)
for end-to-end security [48]. For instance, IEC 62351-6 spec-
ifies VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) to be mandatory
for IEC 61850 GOOSE, where IEC 61850 is mainly used for
delivering data (status, sampled value and command) among
IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) to substation automation
controllers.
Although existing network security solutions, which use
cryptographic techniques to protect data integrity, can be very
effective in defeating the data modifications/injection attacks,
deployment of such techniques calls for an upgrade of all
the existing power generation systems. Definitely, the upgrade
is not only costly, but also has significant impact on the
continuous operations of these systems, and may encounter
interoperability problem [49]. In addition, it is unable to
prevent the attack using direct load manipulation introduced
in Section V-B2. Thus, alternative protection methods need to
be considered, especially for legacy systems.
The attacks presented in this paper take effect due to res-
onance effect. Hence, if the tampered input is reshaped (e.g.,
average), the resonance effect will be weakened such that the
attack fails. Fig. 26 shows the mitigation result when the tam-
pered input is averaged every 2 seconds.5 Fig. 26.b is the load
change faked by a resonance attacker. After the faked load is
reshaped by the power plant, it is changed as Fig. 26.c. Clearly,
as both RoCoF and frequency derivative in Fig. 26.a are very
small, the protected system is stable even if it is attacked.
E. Comparison of LFC Attacks
As the stability and security of power grid is very impor-
tant in modern societies, it is a hot topic in power research
community. Table IV lists the comparison result among LFC
attacks.
The second column shows that the system models used in
the works. Both scheme FDIc (False Data Injection at con-
troller) [21] and the present one are applicable to linear and
non-linear plant models, while the rest focus on LTI (Linear
Time Invariant) model only.
The third column is the comparison of attack points. Both
scheme FDIs (False Data Injection at sensor) [19] and the
present one manipulate the load, while other schemes manip-
ulate the controller input (Cin) or output (Cout). Generally,
the controller signals, especially the controller output, are
protected with dedicated channels, hence it is hard for an
adversary to manipulate them.
The fourth column shows the computational cost for
the attacker. Schemes FDIx [20]–[22] require complicated
optimization processes for every attack operation and are
5If the attacker modifies the actual load as Section V-B2 introduces, the
power system is able to reshape the actual load with transformers, response
delay and electricity storage.
Fig. 26. Countermeasure on resonance attack by using the average value of
load change within 2 seconds.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF ATTACK SCHEMES
very time-consuming, while TDS, DOS and ours do not
require computation process and hence can be launched from
resource-restricted devices, e.g., circuit breaker and smart
meter.
The last column illustrates whether the attacks are appli-
cable to cryptographically protected power systems. As TDS
attack and DOS attack do not change the communication traf-
fic, cryptographic protection technologies can not be used to
defeat them, but schemes FDIx [20]–[22] can be defeated with
integrity protection as they depend on traffic manipulation.
As elaborated in Section V-D, if load manipulation is real-
ized directly, cryptographic protection schemes are invalid in
defeating the present attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented resonance attacks in which
attackers slightly modify the load input such that LFC in
existing electric power generation systems becomes ineffective
in stabilizing the system. The effectiveness of the resonance
attacks are verified and demonstrated by simulating the attacks
on LFC systems which are one of the most critical sub-systems
in smart grids. Based on the simulation results, the proposed
attacks can destabilize both single-area LFC and multi-area
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LFC systems. In order to defeat the resonance attack, we
proposed a countermeasure which reshapes the faked load.
The stability of a close-loop cyber-physical system is tightly
related to its parameters whether it is under attack or not.
Although the present countermeasure is able to stabilize the
system by invalidating the resonance effect, it may be vul-
nerable to advanced attacks. Hence, how to further improve
the countermeasure is interesting. In addition, as renewable
energy resources (e.g., wind, solar or electric vehicles) are
more and more important, and their models are different from
the governor-turbine model, their security and countermeasure
are interesting topics too.
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